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Differences Between the Minimally Conscious State and the Persistent Vegetative State

Mélanie Boly, BS; Marie-Elisabeth Faymonville, MD, PhD; Philippe Peigneux, PhD; Bernard Lambermont, MD, PhD; Pierre Damas, MD, PhD; Guy Del Fiore, PhD; Christian Degueldre, PhD; Georges Franck, MD, PhD; André Luxen, PhD; Maurice Lamy, MD, PhD; Gustave Moonen, MD, PhD; Pierre Maquet, MD, PhD; Steven Laureys, MD, PhD

Arch Neurol. 2004;61:233-238.

Background  The minimally conscious state (MCS) is a recently defined clinical condition; it differs from the persistent vegetative state (PVS) by the presence of inconsistent, but clearly discernible, behavioral evidence of consciousness.

Objective  To study auditory processing among patients who are in an MCS, patients who are in a PVS, and healthy control subjects.

Methods  By means of ¹⁵O-radiolabeled water–positron emission tomography, we measured changes in regional cerebral blood flow induced by auditory click stimuli in 5 patients in an MCS, 15 patients in a PVS, and 18 healthy controls.

Results  In both patients in an MCS and the healthy controls, auditory stimulation activated bilateral superior temporal gyri (Brodmann areas 41, 42, and 22). In patients in a PVS, the activation was restricted to Brodmann areas 41 and 42 bilaterally. We also showed that, compared with patients in a PVS, patients in an MCS demonstrated a stronger functional connectivity between the secondary auditory cortex and temporal and prefrontal association cortices.

Conclusions  Although assumptions about the level of consciousness in severely brain injured patients are difficult to make, our findings suggest that the cerebral activity observed in patients in an MCS is more likely to lead to higher-order integrative processes, thought to be necessary for the gain of conscious auditory perception.

From the Cyclotron Research Center (Ms Boly and Drs Peigneux, Del Fiore, Degueldre, Maquet, Luxen, and Laureys), and the Departments of Neurology (Drs Franck, Moonen, Maquet, and Laureys), Anesthesiology and Reanimation (Drs Faymonville, Damas, and Lamy), Intensive Care Medicine (Drs Faymonville, Lambermont, Damas, and Lamy), Neuropsychology (Dr Peigneux), and Internal Medicine (Dr Lambermont), University of Liège, Liège, Belgium.

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